 |
|
|
||||||||||
|
||||||||||||
 |
||||||||||||
|
|
|
 |
||
Posted to talk.atheism
October 20, 1996 [Happy Birthday to talk.atheism. I have spent many enjoyable (and presumably fruitless) hours providing Christian responses to the concerns expressed therein. Although recently I've not had the time
to post as frequently as before... I lurketh.] INTRODUCTION AND DISCLAIMERS Apparently pointless suffering exists. An all powerful, all knowing god could prevent such suffering if such a god wanted to. An all
good god would want to. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that such an all powerful, all knowing, all good god does not exist.
How would I, as a Christian (and therefore, a theist) meet suchan evidential challenge? First, some disclaimers. Jeff Lowder suggested (in talk.atheism and soc.religion.christian) that theists and other interested
person's might care to pick up a copy of _The Evidential Argument From Evil_ (referenced as EA). This contains, among other articles, William Rowe's original and follow-up articles arguing (evidentially) against the
existence of God (i.e., the theist god), Paul Draper's alter- native evidential argument, and a number of theistic responses and atheistic counter-responses. It's heavy going. Being theologically trained, it
never occurred to me that I'd be unable to understand a theological discussion because I couldn't follow the math :-) A sign of our times, I suppose... Coming to the text with at least a working familiarity
with probabilistic arguments and, specifically, Baye's Theorem, would be advantageous. The second disclaimer is that I intend to use specifically Christian teaching to address the argument. This seems to be
looked down on in the book - those theists who do so seem to feel the need to apologize for doing so. Apparently, the atheistic argu- ment (in this case) is that Christianity is but one variety of theism, so if theism
IN GENERAL fails - so does Christianity. To this I would say that theism is merely a shell, structure, or context in which the viability of Christianity (or any mono theistic religion) is discussed; it in no
way gets to the heart of the issue. That is, I do not primarily believe in a god who is all powerful, all knowing, and all good. I primarily believe in the god who is revealed in Jesus Christ, and I am most
open to the charge of not knowing what I am talking about when I attempt to talk about the Christian god from a theoretical, generic perspective - or when I talk of other gods I've had no dealings with.
So one may consider this a theological, rather than philosophical, response. The third disclaimer is that - bottom line - I am a fideist. That is, I believe one comes to know the god who is revealed in Jesus Christ
through faith, rather than through reason or evidence. In fact, I believe that Christian faith is fundamentally unreasonable (i.e. paradoxical) and non-evidential at its core. Grant me an unreasonable foundation to my
theology, and I believe the rest of my argument will behave reasonably and evidentially :-) The fourth and final disclaimer is that I apparently do not have the necessary imagination to construct alternative
realities - whether the alternative " evil-less" worlds of the philosophers or the future " evil-less" world of traditional theology. I am agnostic regarding alternative worlds (e.g.,
heaven, the millennium, hypothetical perfect worlds without animal suffering, etc.). To the extent that such biblical symbols as fall into that category are meaningful to me, I shall attempt to interpret them
in " this worldly" terms. One last note. I will use the unmodified term " God" to refer to the omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent god who is the focus of the argument.
EVIDENTIAL VS. LOGICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST GOD'S EXISTENCE The logical argument from evil takes its classic expression from J.L. Mackie (Howard-Snyder in EA, p.xii). It has the premise that God and the existence of evil
are logically inconsistent. According to Howard Snyder, the logical argument against the existence of God is no longer considered viable (but see Richard M. Gale, EA, p. 206), the reason being that it is
possible that God (understood throughout this discussion as all powerful, all knowing, and all good) has a justifying reason for permitting the evil. There is nothing LOGICALLY inconsistent with God permitting evil
because of some justifying reason. The evidential argument is more modest. It states that we have rational grounds for believing that pointless evil exists, and such pointless evil provides rational, evidential
grounds for asserting that God does not exist. It does not claim (as does the logical argument) that the belief in the existence of God CANNOT be true (because it is self-con- tradictory); it states, rather,
that - although one COULD be wrong - one is nevertheless rationally justified in believing (on the weight of the evidence) that there is no God. ROWE'S EVIDENTIAL ARGUMENT
Rowe's argument - in its earliest form (1979) - is simple. 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or
permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good
or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. (William L. Rowe, Chapter 1, EA) " The argument is valid; therefore, if we have
rational grounds for accepting its premises, to that extent we have rational grounds for accepting atheism." (Ibid, pp. 2-3) I'll skip over Premise 2. As Rowe says, most atheists and theists would agree on
it. And, as far as I can tell, none of the re- sponding theists in the book challenge Premise 2. This implies that the argument stands or falls on Premise 1. What are the evidential grounds for accepting
Premise 1? Rowe presents a hypothetical: a fawn (known, from here on out in the literature as " Bambi" ) in a distant forest is trapped and severely burned during a forest fire. It lingers in agony
for some days, and then dies. First, as Howard-Snyder said is characteristic of evidential arguments, Rowe does not believe we can KNOW Premise 1 to be true. But are we rationally justified in believing Premise
1 based on what we do know? According to Rowe, it does not seem reasonable that there is some good so intimately connected with Bambi's suffering that an all powerful, all knowing being could not have brought
it about without permitting Bambi's suffering or some evil equally bad or worse. It also does not seem reasonable that there is some evil equally bad or worse that an all powerful, all knowing being could not
have prevented it without the necessity of Bambi's suffering. AND EVEN in the unlikely event that there is some great good or some great evil so intimately connected to Bambi's suffering so as to make that
suffering necessary, is it likely that ALL the instances of such suffering are so connected? In the light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the
idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinarily absurd idea, quite beyond our
belief. It seems then, that although we cannot PROVE that (1) is true, it is, nevertheless, altogether REASONABLE to believe that (1) is true, that (1) is a RATIONAL belief. (Ibid., p.5)
IS ROWE'S ARGUMENT VULNERABLE? Rowe believes his argument can be challenged in three ways. Because theists tend to accept Premise 2, all three involve Premise 1. (All of the following is from Rowe, EA, p.6)
The first challenge does not involve asserting that (1) is false. Instead, it has the very limited goal of showing that Rowe's reasoning in support of (1) is defective in some way. In other words, (1) MAY be
true, but Rowe has not provided sufficient grounds for accepting it. The weakness is that most theists are committed to the assertion that (1) is false. He classifies the second two attacks on Premise
1 as " the direct attack" and " the indirect attack" . The direct attack involves the construction of a theodicy - some reason why even an omnipotent, omniscient being must allow suf- fering
to obtain certain goods or to prevent certain evils. The " free will" defense comes to mind; God allows people to cause suffering because the alternative (i.e. preventing them from doing it) would
lose a greater good (i.e. their free response in an ethical environment). Rowe is not optimistic about an effective " direct attack" response: such a response would require one to know the goods to be
obtained in each case of suffering (including particularly inscrutable one's such as Bambi's), and most religious traditions teach us that that information is not ours to know (in this life, anyway). The
stronger response, in Rowe's estimation, involves " the G.E. Moore shift" used with great effectiveness in the nineteenth century against Humean skepticism (Rowe, EA, pp. 6-7). This argument involves
taking the opposite of your opponent's conclusion and using it as your Premise 1, accepting your oppo- nent's Premise 2, and coming to a conclusion that is the opposite of your opponent's Premise 1. (Tricky, eh?
:-) Not-3. There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so
without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. Therefore, Not-1. It is not the case that there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. COMMENT ON THE THEISTIC RESPONSES IN EA One impression I had was that the
atheistic arguments by Rowe and Draper were short and powerful, and the theistic responses seemed ponderous and difficult to follow. Most of the response seemed to be what Rowe considers the least ambitious
response: Premise One may be true, but you haven't proved it. The overall impression I had was of a lawyer attempting to get his or her client off by claiming that the prosecution had not proved its case beyond
a reasonable doubt. Rowe establishes Premise One by saying that because so much of the suffering we see in the world seems pointless, it is reason- able to believe it IS pointless. Most responses
seemed to say, " you can't prove that's true because an omniscient being may have reasons beyond your ken that justify apparently pointless suffering. "
But Rowe DIDN'T say he had proved it, he said it was reasonable to believe it. My personal belief, particularly after reading Richard M. Gale's savage attacks on the theistic counter-arguments (Gale, EA,
Chapter 11), is that I am convinced that Rowe has established his point - it is reasonable, based on the existence of apparently pointless suffering, for someone to believe that there is no omnipotent, omniscient,
omni-benevolent being. I'm not saying I believe such a person is RIGHT (as a matter of fact, I don't think they are), but I would agree that it is a reasonable belief. In fact, my disappointment at the
theistic response causes me to believe that Gale's scathing, concluding shot (" Let us have faith that van Inwagen's god does not exist, and, if it does, our duty is to resist it with all of the energy and courage
we can muster." (p. 216)) is justified. Draper's response (" The Skeptical Theist" ) is also telling: " The skeptical theist is trying to walk a tightrope - to use skepticism to defend a
position that seems to many to be a paradigm case of something one should be skeptical about." (Paul Draper, EA, p.188). Richard Swinburne's was the first chapter in the book to chal- lenge evidential
arguments from evil. Although I did not find his theodicies convincing, I did feel - after reading the balance of the book - that he was at least fighting on the right battle- field. If anyone has read this
book and can read the theistic response more sympathetically, I'd appreciate your comments. So, why am I not an atheist? MY COUNTER-ARGUMENT TO ROWE I'm going to assume that Rowe understands his
argument and its potential vulnerability better than his opponents do. What, using the G.E. Moore shift, would an effective counter- argument look like? To repeat:
Not-3. There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby
losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. Therefore, Not-1. It is not the case that there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have
prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. Again, I will assume that Premise 2 is common ground between most theists and most atheists. Again, the
argument stands or falls with Premise 1. Can I establish Premise 1? What argument might have Premise 1 as its conclusion? How about: 1. There exist signs of an intentionally realized, ultimate good
which could only be gained by an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being by permitting such suffering as exists. 2. Signs of an intentionally realized, ultimate good which could only be gained by an
omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being by permitting such suffering as exists would not themselves exist in the absence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
3. An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being exists. Are you all convinced? Somehow, I didn't think so . But let's compare Rowe's Premise One with mine: 1. There exist instances of
intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. Rowe argues (in his 1979 argument) that we see
intense suffering that APPEARS to be pointless; it is therefore reasonable to believe it is IN FACT pointless in the absence of counter- evidence. Now let's look at my Premise One: 1. There exist signs
of an intentionally realized, ultimate good which could only be gained by an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being by permitting such suffering as exists. What's good for the goose is good for the gander.
We see suffering that APPEARS to be ultimately justifying and purposeful; it is therefore reasonable to believe that it is IN FACT justifying and purposeful in the absence of counter-evidence. " What
possible good," you may ask, " could only be gained by an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being by permitting such suffering as exists? And what signs could possibly indicate that such a good
exists?" To briefly hint at an answer, I'd merely point out that Christians believe that at least one such instance of suffering - the crucifixion of Jesus - is the paradigm for all such instances.
But expanding this is the subject of another post, and in THIS context it really doesn't matter WHAT the justifying good is perceived to be - so long as it is perceived. The point is, the atheist looks at
instances of suffering and interprets them as pointless. The theist (at least the Christian theist) looks at instances of suffering and interprets them as ultimately valuable, meaningful and purposeful. It
seems to me that one must accept Rowe's conclusion - that one has rational grounds for believing there is no all powerful, all knowing, all good being - before one can accept the premise - that there exists pointless
suffering - that allegedly supports that conclusion. ________________________________________________________________ Howard-Snyder, Daniel, ed. _The Evidential Argument From Evil_. Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 1996. Return to Return to Return to Return to The Inclusive Christian |
||
Return to top of page. |
||