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Kvanvig's _The Problem of Hell Posted February 3, 1997 Introduction: A few weeks ago, Jeff Lowder suggested two books for discussion on the xtianity list. Acquiring both books through inter-library loan, I
resolved to respond to this one first. I have the standard liberal Christian discomfort when it comes to the doctrine of hell :-) What makes this book interesting is that, while argued from a philosophy religion point
of view, the author apparently accepts the claims of orthodox - if not evangelical - Christianity.
Although Kvanvig proposes to construe the problem of hell from a Christian perspective, he believes hell a problem for any religion which accepts an all powerful, all knowing, all benevolent God and also accepts the
idea of some sort of after-life (Kvanvig, p.163). According to Kvanvig, his focus on Christian philosophical resources arises from the fact that *most* philosophical resources dealing with hell are Christian resources.
Again, as an allegedly liberal Christian, I was struck by Kvanvig's argument regarding the necessity of hell in the Christian worldview. If one believes that Jesus Christ is Savior of the world (as I do), the question
immediately arises, " savior from what?" This is not to lock one into any particular *conception* of hell fire and brimstone, alienation from God, total loss of humanity, etc. But - for Christianity and
presumably for any worldview that has a concept of salvation (soteriology) - the question of what one is saved from must be addressed. Or, simply, if Jesus is the answer, what is the question? :-)
Kvanvig's Strong View of Hell: The Strong View of Hell, as conceived by orthodoxy, has (according to Kvanvig) the following elements: [H1] The Anti-Universalism Thesis: Some persons are consigned to hell; [H2] The Existence Thesis: Hell is a place where people exist, if they are consigned there; [H3] The No Escape Thesis: There is no possibility of leaving hell and nothing one can do, change, or become in order to get out of hell, once one is consigned there; and [H4] The Retribution Thesis: The justification for hell is retributive in nature, hell being constituted to mete out punishment to those whose earthly lives and behavior warrant it. (Kvanvig, p.25) The particular view Kvanvig attempts to defend is the Equal Punishment view. This holds that everyone in hell receives the same punishment. This is not strictly
necessary to the strong view, but he chooses it as it is the hardest to defend. An interesting aspect to Kvanvig's argument is the idea that punishment is merited not only by the nature of the wrong and the intent of
the wrong-doer, but by the nature or status of the one wronged. Although this is strange from a modern, egalitarian point of view, it would have be easily accepted in an agricultural feudal culture where it was
obvious that assaulting the Prince's son merited greater punishment than assaulting a fellow serf. We make similar distinctions today, according to Kvanvig, between killing a plant, killing a dog, and killing a person.
Apparently the defense of the Equal Punishment view is that any sin against God, no matter how trivial, merits eternal hell due to the affront to God's status is accepted as a truism within orthodox Calvinism. The
fact that I'd never heard of it, or, more likely, heard of it and forgot it, causes me to ruefully reflect on my liberal beliefs :-)
A moral objection can be made (at least in the minds of many people) to the existence of hell in light of Christianity's claim regarding an all powerful, all knowing and
all loving God. It is, according to Kvanvig, a special (and more difficult) case regarding the problem of evil - more difficult, because the existence of evil can (possibly) be defended by claiming that God allows evil
because it leads to an eventual greater good. In the case of the unfortunate person consigned to the strong version of hell, there is no eventual greater good. Needless to say, many people who wish to salvage some
conception of hell have resorted to unorthodox changes from the strong view. Kvanvig calls these " simple alternatives" . The simple alternatives involve dropping one of the demands of the strong view: which
gives us the idea of universal salvation, the idea that those not destined for heaven are simply annihilated, and the thought that one can eventually repent and be saved even in hell. To be quite honest, Kvanvig's
arguments regarding the weaknesses of both the strong view and the various simple alternatives was quite beyond what I was willing to put my head into. I had a suspicion (as I plowed my way through them) that he was a
bit too quick to dismiss solutions which did not agree with his own solution. For example, one popular response among theological liberals is that hell exists in theory but may not exist in fact. That is, God's work
of salvation *may* *possibly* result in the salvation of all. In this case, the *threat* of hell is still a real threat, whether or not it is instantiated. This happens to be a resolution near and dear to my heart. He
shoots it down by saying it does not address the problem. If hell exists as even a *theoretical* possibility, than it should not cause a moral problem for God to consign someone there. The *practical* possibility that,
in fact, God might not consign *anyone* there does not address THAT moral issue. (Kvanvig, p.76) Oh, well...
In the end, Kvanvig resolves the moral problem (at least to his own satisfaction) through a means that - though deviant from the strong version - is still closer to the strong
version than any of the simple alternatives. He does this through further analysis of the Retributive Thesis - that hell exists to punish sinners. Kvanvig's view seems to hinge on two observations that, to my mind,
are quite clever and worth the headache of the rest of the book. The first is the observation - probably more obvious to atheists who have been the targets of evangelism than to us Christian folk - that when
Christians present the gospel, they present the joys of heaven as resulting from God's benevolence, the love of those whom God created, God's mercy at forgiving our sins, etc. When the person rejects this wonderful,
free gift :-), they are told they will spend eternity in hell to satisfy God's justice. (Kvanvig, p.108) Now, WAIT a minute! What happened to this all loving, all forgiving God?
Apparently, God does not handle rejection well... But the point is a clever one, and Kvanvig uses the example of a child being punished. The parents tell the child that if he / she does not obey a particular order
(e.g., don't play in the street), he / she will be punished. If the child breaks the rule, the CHILD understands the punishment as justice: I have a responsibility to obey my parents, I disobeyed, it is just that they
punish me (as compared to getting punished when I didn't break a rule, or when I didn't know the rule). But from the PARENT'S point of view, the punishment of the child is an act of love and mercy. Allow the child to
suffer punishment NOW so that they will not have to suffer being run over by a car later. (Kvanvig, p.111) Kvanvig says that the problem with BOTH the Strong View of Hell and the simple alternatives is that they both
(implicitly) interpret heaven from God's point of view (mercy) and hell from humanity's point of view (justice). (Kvanvig, p.109) An issuant point of view would see God's character as unchanging. Heaven would be the
best God could provide for those who sought the enjoyment of God's presence, hell would be the best God could provide those who did not seek the enjoyment of God's presence. (Kvanvig, p.112) The other clever
discussion involved societal views regarding the punishment of capital crimes by annihilation (i.e. capital punishment) versus punishment of capital crimes by exile (i.e. life imprisonment). While we normally consider
punishment by exile to be a more lenient punishment than punishment by annihilation, it is not clear that this is necessarily the case. For example, if one was sentenced to life in solitary confinement in a small dark
room without room to move, it is not clear that life imprisonment would be the more lenient punishment. Whether it is more severe to interfere with one's freedom (as incidently, universalism implies) or with one's
existence (as annihilationism implies) remains an open question. (Kvanvig, pp. 138 - 139) And still another clever discussion relating to Kvanvig's issuant conception of hell deals with the moral responsibility of one
confronted with someone intending suicide. While it is often the case that one has a moral obligation to interfere with a suicide in most cases (as when the person may be temporarily depressed, insane, a minor, etc.),
it is not obvious that one has a moral obligation to interfere in a situation where a rational adult, faced with a terminal and excruciating disease in which he / she has access to ALL necessary information, chooses to
end his or her life. (Kvanvig, pp. 140 - 141) Now without tracing in detail the pro's and con's Kvanvig presents regarding the philosophical utility of the opposing points of these preceding discussions in respect to
the doctrine of hell, I'd like to present, in his own words, Kvanvig's resolution. ...hell is a composite system with a teleological component, which is annihilation, and a mechanical component, which involves continued existence. Hell is an afterlife journey toward annihilation. It may even be true that some never get to the end of the road toward annihilation, it may be, that is, that some eternally exist in hell, never coming to see the alternatives clearly or never changing their opposition to the heavenly community, and yet never achieving rationality for those beliefs and desires. (Kvanvig, p.152) Presumably, if they DID come " to see the alternatives clearly" or achieve " rationality for those beliefs and desires" it would be morally permissible for God to allow them to annihilate themselves (i.e., the situation of the rational person with the excruciating, terminal illness would apply).
This composite view of hell] solves the problem of hell because it places the responsibility for ending up in hell squarely on the shoulders of those who choose that option. In particular, as I have developed the view, it implies that for God to do otherwise than to consign such individuals to hell would impugn God's goodness. Hence, not only is hell compatible with the perfect goodness of an all-powerful and all-knowing God but also the perfect goodness of such a being requires hell. Hence, the problem of hell is resolved. (Kvanvig, p.152) While this solves the philosophical issues involved in hell, is this view compatible with Christian teachings - particularly scripture? The account of hell presented so far is true to the biblical record in that hell, like heaven, issues from a stable divine character, the primary constituent of which is love. I have insisted on this conception of the divine character in our understanding of hell. The most radical expression of this love occurs in annihilation. In loving a person, one must be willing to suffer even total loss in allowing another to pursue what they most deeply want. This result is of singular importance to this project and in particular to the issue of the relationship between the philosophical account of hell and appropriate theological constraints on an account of hell, for this picture of the undying love of God for humanity is just what a sensitive reading of the sacred literature of the Christian religion reveals. (Kvanvig, p.153)
I found Kvanvig's book difficult to follow. Part of WHY it was difficult to follow is that while, in my vocation as a
Christian, I have thought a great deal of salvation, I have not lingered over the situation of those who MAY not be saved. There is a second difficulty. My belief in God is very this- worldly. Although I am a fideist
and therefore believe that one ultimately comes to believe in God's salvation through Christ through faith rather than deductive or inductive reasoning, I am nonetheless somewhat modest about the faith one is justified
in having based on the Christian revelation. In particular, while I believe one can experience God's triumph over sin, evil and death in THIS life, I am fairly agnostic regarding other lives. I interpret language in
the Bible referring to a spatial transcendent realm (i.e., heaven) or a temporal transcendent realm (i.e., the Kingdom of God or the Second Advent of Christ) as referring to experiences in THIS world - the only world we
know. I am certainly willing to leave open the possibility of other spatial-temporal realms, but I do not spend much time in speculating about them. Since Kvanvig's thesis requires a belief in the afterlife (which
to me is far more problematic than any of the " simple alternatives" he shot down), I had to do a certain amount of translation into less literalistic thought forms. Given all that, I believe that
biblical language regarding heaven and hell represent the experience of ultimacy (in the language of Tillich) in ordinary life. We experience ultimate meaning, value and purpose in " heavenly"
experience, and we experience the threat to ultimate meaning, value and purpose in hellish experiences. And these experiences, IMHO, are the " home base" of the symbols of " heaven" and
" hell" as used in the Bible. As I believe that these experiences are REAL in what they disclose about the two possible ultimate resolutions to human life (and I believe there ARE only two), I believe
the biblical language is valuable. But I also have universalist tendencies. In the language of orthodoxy, I believe that Christ died for the world, not merely for the Christians, and so the possibility of universal
salvation - to my mind - is based on the all powerful, all knowing and all benevolent nature of God as revealed in Christ. Kvanvig, Jonathan L. _The Problem of Hell_. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Return to top of page.Return to Theology page. Return to Return to The Inclusive Christian |
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