Evans' _The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith_

Posted February 21, 1997

This is the second of two books suggested for discussion by Jeff  Lowder.

It's central question, IMHO, is " in what way is a Christian  justified in stating that they *know* that the incarnational  narrative in the Bible (i.e., the Virgin Birth, the miracles, the  teachings, the death and resurrections, etc.) is true.

Evans' Goal:
The Epistemologically Justified Christian

It seems to me that Evans reaches his goal in the last two chapters of the book. In these chapters, a freshman (James) who has  accepted Jesus as Savior and Lord (in high school) comes to  college where all his secular professors assail his faith.

James, in Evans' opinion, is justified in claiming that despite  all the alleged modern difficulties with miracles (a la Hume),  alleged internal contradictions in the text, the problematic  nature of the idea of the incarnation, the historical-critical  scholars' (*Christian* historical-critical scholars, for the most  part) pessimism regarding the historicity of the incarnational  narrative, James is nonetheless justified in claiming to KNOW  that Jesus was the Son of God, was born of a virgin, performed  the miracles ascribed to him in the Bible, suffered and died for  our sins, was raised by God on the third day, and spent the next  forty days or so roaming Judea in his resurrected body until he  at last ascended to the right hand of God.

I'm sure no one here has ever doubted it... :-)

Evans' Epistemology

Obviously, to say " James is ... justified in claiming to KNOW..."   all of the above requires some re-thinking regarding what it  means to know something. Therefore, I think Evans' Chapter 9,  " Epistemology and the Ethics of Belief"  constitutes the core of  his argument.

He begins by distinguishing his own " modest"  epistemology from  the ambitious nature of more traditional epistemology. Traditional epistemology seeks to defeat skepticism, the claim that we can  know nothing. While such radical skepticism is difficult to state  (for example, it may be true but we could hardly claim to *know*  that it is true), it is also difficult to refute. But we do not  need to refute it, as few people take it seriously outside of  philosophical textbooks.

Most people assume they know things, and for them the interesting  question is *how* do we know what we in fact know.

He then takes on what he calls " classic foundationalism" , an  epistemological tradition tracing its ancestry back to Locke.  According to classic foundationalism, we begin with some few  known facts (either logical or perceptual) and build our knowledge on this foundation.

For classic foundationalism to be viable we need three things:  access to a body of highly certain facts that is sufficient to be  the foundation of our beliefs, our assumed ability to determine  what support those facts lend to our beliefs, and our assumed  ability to regulate our beliefs so as to conform to the evidence.

Evans believes all three things are highly questionable.

The next step in his program is to dismiss what he calls " nonrealistic"  approaches (presumably a la Wittgenstein). Since this  is probably where *I'm* coming from, I was disappointed to see  them designated as " non-realistic" ,  and more disappointed to see them dismissed without discussion.

His reason? They are not what he is getting at, and not, in his  opinion, what most people are interested in. They do not want to  get into language games, they want to know if Jesus was born of  an honest-to-pete Virgin. Oh well.

He then talks about the relationship between knowledge, justification and warrant. He dismisses what he calls " deontological"   approaches that stress the necessity of doing one's epistemological duty (i.e. gathering facts in the classical foundationalist  perspective) as a ground for knowledge. His chief reason for the  dismissal is that one may do one's epistemological duty and  *still* arrive at a false conclusion, or a true yet unjustified  conclusion.

He replaces this conception with the idea of justification or  warrant. We are warranted in claiming to know something if there  is a truth-conducive ground connecting us to the knowledge; i.e.,  we gathered the knowledge through human capacities designed for  that purpose. This knowledge is prima facie - it can be defeated.  But, in the absence of defeaters, we are justified in claiming to  know it EVEN - and this is important - if we are unable to provide much in the way of evidence to others.

For example, I know that there is a box of Richfood's Macaroni  and Cheese Dinner on my desk. [I'm not sure WHY it's on my desk,  but that's another question.]

I know this because I can see it there, my eyes are designed to  give me accurate perceptual information under normal circumstances, and I have no reason to suspect that they are malfunctioning  or that these are not normal circumstances.

If someone were to come to my house and tell me that my glasses  have a defect that causes them to see macaroni boxes or that I'm  the target of an intelligence operation and that the box actually  contains a microphone, THEN I may have reason to question my  knowledge (or to get less weird friends).

But in the absence of such defeaters, I am justified in claiming  to KNOW that the box is there.

Notice that I can't do much to convince you who are READING this  via the Internet that it is there. But I know it, and you will  either have to take my word for it or not - as the case may be.  But, in any event, *I* am justified in knowing it despite my  inability to provide *you* with much in the way of evidence.

This, in turn, leads to what he calls " externalism" . Internalism  is the epistemological stance that says one must know *internally*, through reflection, that one knows and *how* one knows.  Externalism says that this is not necessary. One can know something without *knowing* that they know it, and, therefore, without  being fully aware of *how* they know it.

Once one accepts a modest epistemology, and abandons deontological justifications of knowledge and internalism, the way is open  for acceptance of what Evans calls a " modified foundationalism" .  In this modified foundationalism, some of our beliefs are taken  to be " basic"  beliefs in that they are not based on other beliefs. On the other hand, though not based on other beliefs these  basic beliefs can still be defeated by the evidence.

Evans concludes the chapter with a discussion of good epistemic  virtue in light of his modified foundationalism, and comes up  with such things as being open to possible defeaters, and not  abusing drugs or alcohol that might impair one's perceptual  processes, etc.

Modified Foundationalism and the Epistemologically Justified Christian

So what does all this accomplish for Evans?

It allows Evans to look at the faith of a Christian (in this  case, James) from two perspectives.

From the Reformed perspective, using the idea of the inspiration  of the Holy Spirit, James is capable of saying that he has  learned the facts of the incarnational narrative from God through  his experience of the incarnational narrative meeting his need  for acceptance and forgiveness.

From a historical perspective, he can claim historical knowledge  gained through perceptual processes designed to arrive at the  truth: the Bible, and the teachings of the Church (particularly  the initial four ecumenical councils). This data can be augmented  by arguments such as C.S. Lewis' madman, liar or Son of God  argument.

He (James) has a responsibility to consider possible defeaters  INSOFAR as he has the time and intellectual resources to do so.

And Evans would believe that if James had the time and ability,  he could make an effective response to the possible defeaters  brought to his attention by his professors - particularly to the  claims of the historical-critical scholars.

But, if James' time and intellectual ability are exhausted, and  his secular professors' remain unconvinced by such response as he  can make, than James is STILL justified in claiming knowledge -  because the fact that one cannot convince others that one's  beliefs are justified does not mean that one's beliefs are NOT  justified.

My Response to Evans' Modified Foundationalism

I had a real love-hate (mostly hate) relationship with this book.  The source of this is probably to be found in therapy rather than  intellectual discussion, but, for what it's worth, that was my  visceral response to Evans' argument.

I think he made some excellent points. A good argument can be  made, IMHO, to those who would say that ordinary people should  construct what they believe from a foundation of their certain  sense perceptions. Whether or not this is desirable or even  possible, the plain fact of the matter (IMHO) is that NO ONE does  this. EVERYONE has beliefs that are prior to the evidence - what  Evans calls " basic beliefs" .

And common Enlightenment findings such as " there is no evidence  for miracles"  or " there is no supernatural prophecy of future  events in the Bible"  - for whatever truth they may contain -  inevitably result from their own secular presuppositions.

There IS a sense in which one believes due to the inner witness  of the Spirit. When I became a Christian, I heard John 3:16 and  believed it, on the spot, without first conducting an exhaustive,  historical criticism of the available evidence.

Now, in Evans terminology, I suppose such a basic belief could be  defeated. I was not a fundamentalist, so arguments against the  inerrancy of the Bible left my beliefs pretty much intact. An  evidential argument that would sway me would have to be radical,  and present either a non-existent Jesus or (more likely) a historical Jesus who did not resemble the Christ of the Bible and  the creeds in some significant way. [And, for example, should  someone convince me that Jesus was not born of a Virgin (which  would not take much convincing), that would not be significant  enough.]

A more likely defeater would be an " existentialist"  defeater -  that is, if I became convinced that ordinary daily life itself  provided counter-evidence to the gospel. And again, this would  have to be something more significant than a " can miracles  violate natural law?"  argument. It would probably have to result  from a failure of the Christian theodicy to deal with (not necessarily explain) the problem of evil.

But apart from such sympathy as I have for Evans argument, I have  a massive problem with calling such belief " knowledge."  I would  consider myself a fideist - but Evans, for some reason, seems  anxious to distinguish his position from that.

Yet how is his " James"  claiming to know that the incarnational  narrative is true different from James' friend Tom (my literary  invention) claiming to know that Christian Identity (the movement  based on the idea that Christ's salvation is for white people and  that Jews are the spawn of Satan) is true?

Tom can claim that his belief is the same basic belief that James  can claim. Tom can also respond to possible defeaters as best he  can, yet maintain his claim to knowledge even if he can't overcome them - just like James.

Yet I - and I suspect Evans - would not accept Tom's claim that  he KNOWS that Jews are the spawn of Satan. Modest epistemology,  truth-conducive ground, externalist approach, or not.

It seems that Tom, James and myself (and Evans) are ALL making a  claim for revealed truth - that is, it seems we are all fideists.  And I think that it is an open question whether or not ALL people  (including atheists) may have some set of basic assumptions that  go beyond what can be derived from inductive or deductive reasoning.

But calling such claims *knowledge* seems merely to de-value to  word. I would rather claim to know less. To admit that I have  beliefs that are based on my subjective experience (and the  subjective experience of the Christian community) is not, in my  opinion, to render those beliefs irrelevant.

Evans, C. Stephen. _The Historical Christ and the Jesus of  Faith_. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.

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Bill Bekkenhuis

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